Ranking Sovereign Sukuk Issuance Outcomes Under Macroeconomic Regime Shifts: A Picture Fuzzy Multi Criteria Framework for Turkish Treasury Auctions

Abstract

Sovereign sukuk auctions represent a structural funding channel for the Turkish Treasury, but their outcomes have not been systematically evaluated as multidimensional design decisions under different macroeconomic regimes. This study assembles all 66 domestic lease certificate auctions held between November 2018 and December 2025 and evaluates 53 fixed-rate auctions using four regime-adjusted criteria: the coupon relative to the prevailing central bank policy rate, maturity, the auction share in the monthly Treasury borrowing program, and the coupon spread over a maturity-matched conventional Treasury benchmark. Entropy weights are cross-checked using Criteria Importance Through Intercriteria Correlation (CRITIC), the Method Based on the Removal Effects of Criteria (MEREC), and logarithmic percentage change-driven objective weighting. Picture fuzzy ratings are calibrated from auction outcomes, with hesitation linked to bootstrap estimation uncertainty rather than an arbitrary formula. Picture fuzzy Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) and Multi-Criteria Optimization and Compromise Solution (VIKOR), using picture fuzzy weighted aggregation, produce independent rankings. Weighted Aggregated Sum Product Assessment (WASPAS), Combined Compromise Solution (CoCoSo), and Measurement of Alternatives and Ranking According to Compromise Solution (MARCOS) provide additional cross-checks. The five ranking methods demonstrate strong agreement: the Kendall coefficient between the picture fuzzy methods is 0.8084, and pairwise Spearman correlations are at least 0.915. The leading designs are direct-sale placements between 2019 and early 2021 that accounted for the entire monthly auction funding program, led by the December 2020 five-year placement and the low-cost February and August 2019 placements. Rankings remain stable under five alternative weighting schemes, halved and doubled uncertainty scales, the removal of 2020 and all auctions with missing benchmark cells, compromise-parameter sweeps, and rank-reversal tests involving 1,000 bootstrap resamples. The findings are consistent with preferred-habitat and clientele interpretations of the participation-bank investor base and provide insights into auction design under disinflation. From a policy perspective, the proposed framework can support Treasury decision-makers in identifying auction structures that balance funding costs, maturity considerations, and borrowing-program requirements under changing monetary conditions.